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 INGO HEIDBRINK
Continue Trawling and Continue Negotiations: 
The 50-mile conflict
Soon after World War II, the German deep-sea trawling industry started the rebuilding of the
fleet and fishing operations in areas far distant from their homeports at the German Bight. The
grounds off Iceland quickly became one of the most important fishing regions for this fleet once
again. Therefore it was no wonder that Germany was involved in the conflicts about fishery
limits like any other European fishing nation. But during the twelve-mile conflict in the 1950s
the Federal Republic of Germany was a young nation with a very special position in the field of
international political affairs. Germany was not in the position to play a major role in the conflict.
In fact Germany accepted the Icelandic claims to the twelve-mile limit virtually without engage-
ment in the conflict.1 Nevertheless, there was one aspect which would become important for the
further development. After the conflict between Great Britain and Iceland was settled, the Federal
Republic claimed a position similar to that of Great Britain regarding fishing rights off Iceland,
and they were granted.2 Particularly one point in the agreement of 1961 would become relevant
in the future: Iceland and Germany agreed that a further widening of the Icelandic fisheries limit
should be announced to the Federal Republic early and the International Court of Justice was
accepted as a court for any conflicts that might result from any further action taken by Iceland.3
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Fig. 1   In the 1970s, the factory-stern-trawlers of the so called Universitäts-Klasse made the German deep-sea
fisheries fleet one of the world’s most sophisticated fishing fleets. (Archiv DSM / Photo: DSM-Nordsee-Archiv)
Only ten years later, when Iceland unilaterally declared the new fishing limit of 50 miles in
19724,  this situation had changed dramatically. On the one hand, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many was no longer an “underdog” on the political scene, but economically one of the most
powerful nations in Western Europe and an important partner in the defence system of the
NATO. On the other hand, the structure of German deep-sea fisheries had also changed. In the
early 1970s, instead of a small fleet in a start-up period, Germany possessed one of the world’s
most sophisticated fishing fleets. Only a few years earlier, one of the most challenging factory-
trawler construction programmes had been completed.
At the beginning of the 1970s, the German deep-sea trawling fleet thus included not only 66
fresh-fish-trawlers but also 52 factory-stern-trawlers.5 The background for the building of this
fleet was the assumption of increasing fish consumption in Germany as well as the unlimited
availability of fishing grounds in the North Atlantic.
Iceland claim to the 50-mile limit was a real shock for the German fishing industry. The prob-
lem was not only the potential loss of one or two fishing grounds but the failure of investments
worth hundreds of millions of German Marks or several billions of Icelandic crowns. The mere
acceptance of the 50-mile limit was no option for the German fishing industry.
After the failure of the first round of diplomatic negotiations6, Germany took the case to the
International Court of Justice on June 5, 1972, just as Great Britain had done a few weeks earlier.7
When the new Icelandic regulations on the 50-mile limit went into effect, there was already an
interim order by the International Court of Justice in The Hague.8 The court decided that Iceland
was not entitled to use its new regulations against German and British trawlers but at the same
time reduced the total annual catch of these fishing fleets in the Icelandic area. Although this
judgement seems to have offered an interim solution to the conflict, neither side reacted as
demanded by the court. Iceland used coast-guard vessels to prohibit any foreign trawling inside
the 50-mile limit and Germany did not reduce its fishing activities. 
Although there was a second interim order in July 19739, the whole procedure at the Interna-
tional Court of Justice had no influence on the everyday situation in the grounds off Iceland. Ger-
man fishing vessels continued trawling inside the limit and Iceland tried to prohibit any fishing
by foreign trawlers by intensive use of coast-guard vessels and especially of a new weapon, the
trawl wire cutter.
A few incidents with the use of weapons were reported, but they remained limited to a few
exceptions without further consequences.10
By the autumn of 1973, the situation for German trawlers in the Icelandic area was very simi-
lar to that of British ships and is well known. But after the agreement between Great Britain and
Iceland this situation changed dramatically and seems to have all but fallen into oblivion in Ice-
land and Germany alike. 
When the agreement between Iceland and Great Britain was signed, all British trawlers and
navy ships left the Icelandic area.11 Only the German trawlers and a few fishery protection ves-
sels continued their operations. At first, in the autumn of 1973 Germany decided to send an addi-
tional auxiliary fishery protection vessel to Iceland, the former trawler NORDENHAM. In the offi-
cial announcement to the Icelandic government, the NORDENHAM was referred to as a hospital
301
Fig. 2   The trawl wire
cutter. (Landhelgis-
gæslan, Ísland)
Fig. 3   Scheme of the use
of the trawl wire cutter.
(Landhelgisgæslan, Ísland)
ship12, but its real duty was also to provide German trawlers with information about the opera-
tion areas of the Icelandic coast-guard vessels and if possible to assist the trawlers against the use
of the trawl wire cutters. 
The coast guard was increasingly successful in its struggle against the German trawlers and in
October 1973 the O‹INN alone managed to cut the entire gear of three trawlers in less than ten
days.13 A few days later the German government announced the sending of two further auxiliary
fishery protection vessels to Iceland and beginning in January 1974 there were seven such ships
operating in the Icelandic area. All were called hospital ships, but their duties comprised much
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Fig. 4   The trawler NORDENHAM as a provisional fishery protection vessel. (Archiv DSM)
Fig. 5   The Icelandic coast-guard vessel O-DINN, the most important Icelandic ship in all the conflicts on fishing
limits after World War II. (Photo: Heidbrink)
more than the provision of medical and technical support to the fishing fleet. In a verbal note
issued by the German embassy to the Icelandic ministry of foreign affairs, the tasks of the fishery
protection vessels were described as follows: 
“Within the framework of the pertinent instructions issued to them by the Federal Govern-
ment, the German fishery protection vessels are trying to protect the German trawlers against
such unlawful action by Icelandic coast-guard vessels.”14
Throughout this period, a continuous series of negotiations was in progress which seems to
have been more or less successful. The only issue for which there seemed to be no solution what-
soever was that of the factory freezer trawlers. Then, however, on November 24, 1974, the
ARCTURUS incident occurred, changing the entire situation. The German trawler ARCTURUS was
brought up by an armed coast-guard vessel and the master of the ship was charged with illegal
fishing before an Icelandic court.15 In response, the German fisheries and fishing harbour au-
thorities now started to play hardball against Iceland. 
All landings by Icelandic trawlers were banned in the German fishing ports.16 In fact, while
Great Britain had sent its navy to Iceland as a demonstration of power, Germany now started to
force a kind of an economic war against Iceland. Although Germany was not the main market for
Icelandic trawlers, this ban caused serious damage to the Icelandic fisheries. This was not the first
step towards an economic conflict. Already in March 1973 Germany had blocked negotiations on
the reduction of tariffs between Iceland and the EU.17 Even during the annual meetings of the
OECD and the GATT in 1974 Germany had adhered to its unbending position. While Iceland
explained that 15.5% of its entire export to Germany was blocked by the landing ban and de-
manded a settlement via the OECD or GATT system , the German legation at the OECD simply
declared: “We think that neither the OECD Convention nor the ‘Trade Pledge’ are in any way
involved.”18
In fact the conflict between Germany and Iceland was in a deadlock. Iceland had neglected the
competence of the International Court of Justice, and Germany the competence of the OECD and
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Fig. 6   The trawler ARCTURUS, the only German ship to be captured by Iceland. (Photo: DSM-Nordsee-Archiv)
the GATT. Furthermore, while the conflicts between Iceland and all other fishing nations had
been settled, Germany continued trawling inside the limit and continued bilateral negotiations.
So much for the pure facts, but what was the background of this behaviour – so different from
that of any other fishing nation – and what were the results? Why was there no chance for an
agreement of the kind concluded between Iceland and Great Britain in 1973? Was there an
advantage to be gained by Germany or would have it been better to accept an agreement?
As mentioned earlier, there were two structural differences between Germany and Great
Britain: First of all, the German fishing fleet consisted to a much larger extent than the British of
factory-freezer trawlers. Secondly – and perhaps more importantly – the German fishery protec-
tion was not part of the navy but of the civilian fleet of the ministry of agriculture. 
For this reason the engagement of the German fishery protection vessels could hardly be inter-
preted as military action against Iceland. After the British navy vessels had left the Icelandic area,
the military conflict seemed to be solved. Even the increased operations of German fishery pro-
tection vessels could not be seen as an escalation of the conflict. In fact, this situation was some-
thing of a political trap for Iceland. On the one hand everybody could assume that the actual task
of the fishery protection vessels was similar to that of the British navy vessels; on the other hand,
any sympathy for Iceland would have been lost if Iceland had started to take action against civi-
lian hospital ships. The use of civilian fishery protection vessels instead of navy vessels prohib-
ited an escalation of the conflict on the fishing grounds.
The question of the factory freezer trawlers was more difficult. These ships naturally used the
same fishing gear as the fresh-fish catchers and the German interpretation of factory freezer
trawlers as vessels of similar quality as fresh-fish catchers appeared correct at first sight. But it
was a matter of fact that these ships had much better means of reacting to bad catches on one
fishing ground over a certain period of time. Because of the freezing equipment they could stay
in the Icelandic region as long as it was necessary to get a full load. The German argumentation
that Iceland was not entitled to blame the German deep sea trawling fleet because of its state of
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Fig. 7   German fishery protection vessels such as the FRITHJOF were not navy vessels but civilian vessels under the
flag of the ministry of agriculture. (Archiv DSM / Photo: Krügler)
technological development could not be accepted by Iceland. Nobody in Iceland promoted the
sophistication of the German trawlers, and why should a sovereign nation like Iceland accept
disadvantages caused only by the expectation of better economic benefits in a foreign country?
Despite the fact that, in the course of the negotiations, Iceland made several offers for an
arrangement which would have granted Germany a phasing out of the Iceland fisheries without
major disadvantages, Germany replied to all offers in the same way. The possibility of the use of
factory freezer trawlers was a conditio sine qua non. In retrospect this seems especially irrational,
because the Icelandic area was not the main operational area for those ships. The factory freezer
trawlers operated near Newfoundland, Labrador and Greenland as well as in other very far
distant fishing grounds. Iceland was the operational area for the remaining fleet of fresh-fish
catchers. In fact, the factory freezer trawler question could not have been the real reason why
Germany stuck to its position.
An explanation may be found in the catch data pertaining to the early 1970s. When the Icelan-
dic-British agreement was signed in 1973, the annual catch of German trawlers near Iceland
(1972) was 95,000 t.19 In the negotiations Germany demanded a quota of 105,000 t. But a quota
that would have been comparable with the Icelandic-British agreement would have been only
65,000 t, which was exactly what Iceland offered in the negotiations.20 The acceptance of this offer
would have meant the loss of 30,000 t of catch per year in comparison to the actual situation. A
volume of 30,000 t annual catch in comparison to 35 fishing gears cut by the Icelandic coast-guard
vessels: From the purely economic point of view the conclusion was clear: Continue trawling. But
why also continue negotiations? Of course, most of the delegates were interested in finding a
solution to the conflict. But the continuation of the negotiations was at the same time a tool to
prevent an increase of the Icelandic actions against German trawlers. As long as an agreement
seemed to be within reach, the negotiations prohibited further Icelandic action.
Altogether a minimum of 35 fishing gears of German trawlers were cut by the Icelandic coast
guard and nearly 500 attempts to stop German trawling operations were reported.21
– For the possibility of catching an additional 30,000 t of fish per year, this was a more reason-
able price than would have been demanded by any negotiated arrangement.
But how was the situation finally resolved?
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Fig. 8   The development
of the Icelandic fisheries
limit to 200 nm. (Land-
helgisgæslan, Ísland)
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In 1975 Iceland announced a further step in its widening of the fishery limits, now to 200 miles.
Great Britain responded once again with navy vessels and another real cod war started.
At the same time the negotiations in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
reached a stage where it became clear that future international law would include expanded fish-
eries limits for the coastal nations. The era of the ‘continue trawling and continue negotiations’
policy was over. There were only two solutions: either join the British side and take action against
the Icelandic coast-guard vessels or accept the loss of the fishing grounds. Germany chose the
second option. Between 1972 and 1975/1976 there was enough time to restructure the German
fishing industry on the basis of fish import instead of the country’s own catches. What is more, it
was no longer possible to keep the conflict out of the limelight of the international political scene.
To sum up, the German behaviour in the 50-mile conflict was closely related to the fact that
nearly everybody in Iceland thought only of Great Britain in connection with the fishing con-
flicts. Germany could therefore continue trawling without attracting major attention. Even at a
time when Germany was the only nation that had not accepted the Icelandic regulations of 1972,
the amount of attention paid to the matter in Iceland was not a great as that paid to the previous
conflict with the British, as the German action was a purely civilian operation without any inter-
ference by the navy.
In a certain sense, Germany continued exploiting its early post-World-War-II position as a
political “underdog” with a minor fishing fleet despite the fact that by the 1970s it was a politi-
cally and economically important nation with one of the largest deep-sea fishing fleets in Europe.
Germany did not give a demonstration of naval power against Iceland, but tried to a certain
extent to hide its fishing and fishery protection activities. This can be regarded as merely another
form of unfair play – and I am sure it was not gentleman-like – but in a certain sense it was suc-
cessful. The British approach of blaming a small nation by a demonstration of naval power failed
much earlier than the German concept of accepting Iceland as an equal partner, at least when
Iceland declared the 200-mile fisheries limit.
Although this paper deals with one of the most difficult periods of the German-Icelandic fisheries
history, and surely – in retrospect – it can be said that there were mistakes and awkward beha-
viour on both sides, I will finish this paper with one very important aspect which should not be
forgotten: Even in the worst times of the conflict there was an unwritten agreement on support
in any emergency. For example, the German fishery protection vessels offered their support for
the evacuation of Heimaey after the volcanic eruption in 1973, and the Icelandic coast guard and
the entire Icelandic society granted every kind of medical support to any German crew member
of a trawler after an accident or injury of any type, even if it happened during illegal fishing inside
the Icelandic fisheries limit. 
You will know the frequently quoted term “friends in conflict” or – in a translation of a Ger-
man term – “the art of war between friends” and that is in my opinion not only the background
for the good relations in the fisheries branches of Iceland and Germany today but also for the
ceremony in Vík í My´rdal tomorrow. The opening of a fisheries memorial that will not be only in
honour of those crew members of German trawlers who lost their lives on the fishing grounds off
Iceland but as well in honour of those Icelanders who risked their lives in rescue operations.
The chapter of history which dealt with the fisheries conflicts is as much concluded as German
fishery off Iceland, and it is time to remember a development which started 111 years ago with
the arrival of the first German trawler off Iceland, time to express thanks for the good relations
between our nations despite the difficult decades, and time to look forward to a future of respon-
sible use of the resources of the oceans as our common heritage, administrated by the coastal
nations, as well as good trade and general relations between our nations.
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